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TRIBAL CONTROL OF EXTRADITION
FROM RESERVATIONS
Case law relating to tribal control of extradition from the reservation was practically non-existent until a short time ago. Like so many
other areas of Indian law it has laid dormant over the years for
various reasons. As will be seen later, provisions regarding extradition
are found in many treaties executed in 1868; however, until 1969
the only guidelines available to Indian tribes were the general rules of
tribal sovereignty. The purpose of this Comment is to explore tribal
control of extradition, primarily through the case of State of Arizona ex rel Merrill v. Turtle', to ascertain whether that decision
provides more definitive guidelines that may be used by Indian tribes
across the country to determine the extent of their power to control
extradition. It is important to examine previously untouched areas of
law pertaining to Indians and provide an analysis of the law for the
tribes throughout the country so that they might determine whether
the law is applicable to them and whether it should be implemented
or enacted by the tribal government.
Apparently, the primary reason for the federal government's long
recognition of the right of Indian tribes to have some type of selfgovernment is that since pre-historic times the' various tribes have
operated as independent political entities. No tribal governments
were organized in the same way, nor were any organized in a very
formal fashion, but each functioned in a practical manner and served
its own purposes well.2 It may fairly be inferred from history that
the operation of the various tribal governments continued undisturbed until the white settlers had organized their own government
and were an established military power.
Soon it became necessary for the government of the white settlers
to obtain more land for the ever increasing number of immigrants.
By means of treaty3 and military victory4 Indian lands were made
available to the settlers. This was to be the pattern followed until the
government had conquered land from the east coast to the west.
As this procedure was followed and the problem of "what to do
1. 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 551 (1970).
2. J. Hunter, Manners and Customs of Indian Tribes, 222-39, 305-12, 319-28 (1823); L.

Morgan, Ancient Society, 49-204 (1964).
3. See generally, C. Kappler, 2 Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, S. Doc. No. 319, 58th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1904) [hereafter cited as Kappler], wherein is recorded treaties made by
the United States with the Indians. The first recorded treaty is with the Delawares, made in

1778.
4. See generally, A. Josephy Jr., The Nez Perce Indians and the Opening of the Northwest (1965), 445-573; S.Humphrey, The Indian Dispossessed (1905).
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with the Indians" was resolved by the institution of the reservation
system,' the question of what is an Indian reservation and what
powers the people living on them have came to the forefront.
One of the earliest cases to consider these questions was Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia.6 The Cherokee Nation sought an injunction to
restrain the State of Georgia from executing certain laws which took
no cognizance of tribal sovereignty, and which, it was alleged, were
enacted to seize the land for the use of the state. Before delving into
the merits of the case Chief Justice Marshall considered the question
of whether the Cherokee's reservation constituted a foreign state. He
found that there were marked distinctions between the relations of
foreign states and the United States and those between an Indian
reservation and the United States. Indian territory was obviously
within the boundaries of the United States. The federal government
also had assumed the duties of protecting the Indians and regulating
their commercial intercourse with foreign states. These factors would
not allow an Indian reservation to be denominated a foreign nation.
Chief Justice Marshall deemed them to be "domestic dependant
nations," 7 which remains the most accurate categorization of their
political status. The court denied the application for an injunction on
jurisdictional grounds.
One year later, in Worcester v. Georgia,' the court again discussed
the status of an Indian reservation. A citizen of the State of Vermont
was convicted under the laws of Georgia 9 for residing in Cherokee
country without a permit from the state and without having taken an
oath of loyalty to the state. These laws, it was contended, were
enacted to seize land held by the Cherokees for the use of the state
in that they ignored Indian title to the land and assumed state control.
Again Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion, but in this case he
seemingly retreated from his opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
supra. Throughout his analysis of the status of a reservation in this
opinion, he alludes to the possibility that a reservation may have-a
status higher than that of a domestic dependant nation. Indeed, he
considered it as a nation:
5. "There are three kinds of Indian reservations: those which were created by treaties
previous to 1871; those which have been created by acts of Congress since 1871; and those
made by Executive Orders whereby the President has set apart public lands for the use of
the Indians in order to keep them within a certain territory." Sioux Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 150, 170 (1941).
6. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).

7. Id. at 17.
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
9. These were apparently the same laws that were challenged in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
particular region claimed; and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means
"a people distinct from the others." The constitution, by declaring
treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme
law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties
with the Indian nations, and consequently, admits their rank among
those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words
"treaty" and "nation," are words of our own language, selected in
our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each
a definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth;
they are applied to all in the same sense.' 0

It was held that the Cherokee Nation was a distinct community in
which the laws of the State of Georgia could have no effect.
The reasoning of these cases and the historical fact of aboriginal
self-government noted therein formed the basis for recognizing the
fact that there are substantive powers of self-government which are
legally recognized as within the domain of tribal sovereignty. Among
these powers is the power to administer justice.' ' This power was
fairly broad at first, but has been limited somewhat over the years.' 2
Basically, however, the power 'remains-used more by some tribes

than by others.
The special status accorded to Indian reservations gave rise to

criminal jurisdiction distinct from those of a state or other commuAlthough thousands of cases involving Indians have been
nity.'
10. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
11. Dep't. Int., Office of the Solicitor, Solicitor's Opinion: Powers of Indian Tribes,
M-27781, 55 Dept. of Int. 64 (Oct. 25, 1934).
12. See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1969), making
Indians subject to punishment and prosecution by the federal government for the commission of any of the criminal acts listed; and 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1964), which governs the
punishment for offenses committed by Indians. It disallows jurisdiction where the offense is
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, where the act is
committed by an Indian in Indian country and he has been punished by tribal law, or where
jurisdiction is reserved to the tribe by treaty.
13. See, Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963), where it was held
that where Congress exercises its plenary power and withdraws tribal jurisdiction as to major
crimes listed in 25 U.S.C. § 1153 (1964), tribal jurisdiction as to crimes not named is left
undisturbed. See also, M. Crosse, Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 4
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litigated over the years, this special status of the reservations in the
area of tribal powers and criminal jurisdiction has yet to be solidified
into a clear-cut body of law. As one issue becomes settled another
arises that has never before been considered. Such is the question of
the powers of a tribe to control extradition.
As with many of the powers that a tribe may potentially possess it
is impossible to determine absolutely whether they have a particular
power until they attempt to exercise it or until concrete guidelines
are established by statute. Although there has been but one case
concerning the power to control extradition, it is possible to derive
therefrom the factors considered by the court in recognizing that
power.
The case of State of Arizona ex rel Merrill v. Turtle, supra, involved a situation in which a Cheyenne Indian, who was married to a
Navajo woman, was sought by the State of Oklahoma on a charge of
second degree forgery. Upon finding that the defendant and his wife
had moved onto the Navajo reservation, Oklahoma filed an application with the Navajo Tribal Council for the defendant's extradition.
The application was denied by the Navajo Tribal Court on the
ground that tribal law provided for extradition only to the states of
Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. 1" Oklahoma then made demand on
the Governor of Arizona for defendant's extradition. A warrant was
issued and 'was executed by defendant's arrest on the reservation.
While being held in custody in Arizona, defendant sought a writ of
habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona. The writ was granted on the ground that Arizona authorities had exceeded their jurisdiction by arresting defendant on the
Navajo reservation. The State of Arizona argued that article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution' I requires that the state
retain extradition jurisdiction over Indian residents of the Navajo
reservation.
In affirming the District Court's decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered, among other things, the
relationship between the Navajo Tribe, the United States, and the
State of Arizona. In this, the court had the benefit of two earlier
Arizona L. Rev. 57 (1962); Note, CriminalJurisdiction Over Indians and Post-Conviction
Remedies, 22 Montana L. Rev. 165 (1961); Kane, Jurisdiction Over Indians and Indian
Reservations, 6 Arizona L. Rev. 237 (1965).
14. 17 Navajo Tribal Code § 1001 (1969).
A person charged in any State with
15. The pertinent portion of that section reads: .
Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the Crime ... "
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cases that had explored this relationship: Williams v. Lee' 6 and
Littell v. Nakai.
Williams involved a suit to collect for goods sold on the reservation
on credit to a Navajo Indian and his wife by a merchant who also
resided on the reservation. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that
the Arizona courts are free to exercise jurisdiction over civil suits by
non-Indians against Indians, even though the action arises on the
reservation, since no act of Congress expressly forbids their doing so.
In overruling this decision, the United States Supreme Court stated
that "essentially, absent governing acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of the
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Cf.
Utah & Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28... "' ' The court
further stated that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction would
undermine the authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs and
thereby would infringe on the right of Indians to govern themselves.
The same reasoning was followed in Littell, supra, where the court
relied heavily on the decision in Williams. Littell involved a dispute
between the Navajo Tribe's general counsel and the tribal chairman
who was attempting to force an early termination of a contract
between the general counsel and the tribe. It was held that the tribal
courts had exclusive jurisdiction under the principles espoused in
Williams.
The court in Turtle, supra, gave a brief summary of these cases, 9
stating that the history reviewed in them shows that Indian tribes
historically were regarded as distinct political communities, protected by treaty from the laws of any state and subject only to the
plenary power of Congress. 2 0 Thus, the historical fact of sqlf-government by an Indian tribe was an important factor in allowing control
of extradition, much as it has been in the establishment of many
other tribal powers. As a matter of evidence, it would be no problem
to establish the fact of historical self-government in extradition cases.
In dealing with the State's argument that it had extradition jurisdiction over the Navajo Reservation through article IV, section 2 of
the United States Constitution, the court first stated that because
there was no authority available on this particular point, the Constitutional provision must be interpreted in light of the 1868 Navajo
Treaty with the United States, and in light of the historical principle
of retained tribal sovereignty. The result was essentially the same as
16. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
17. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965).

18. 358 U.S. at 220.
19. 413 F.2d at 684.
20. Id.
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that reached in Williams, supra, i.e., that the tribe has a right of
self-government that is free from state interference, absent specific
Congressional action. There being no Congressional action in this
particular area, the question came down to whether the state's action
infringed on the tribe's right to make their own laws and be governed
by them; and the court held that it clearly did.
That the relationship between the right of self-government and the
power to control extradition is essential and intimate was recognized
long ago in Kentucky v. Dennison.2' There it was held that a state is
not compelled to exercise its constitutional duty of extradition.
Further, it was apparent to the court in Turtle that the Navajo Tribe
was intended to have exclusive control over extradition because
article I of the Treaty of 186822 so provides. The court inferred that
control over extradition was intended to be exclusive from the fact
that money damages were the only remedy provided by the treaty
for the wrongful refusal to extradite. Finally, it was noted that the
Navajo Tribe had been exercising its jurisdiction over extradition
since 1956, when the Tribal Council adopted a provision controlling
procedures for Indian extradition. 2 3 In light of this tribal code provision, it could not now be said that the state would not be infringing
on tribal sovereignty by exercising extradition jurisdiction on the
reservation.
From this lone case, four factors emerge that are important in
determining whether the power to control extradition exists. These
factors are, (1) the general historical background of the Indian
people; (2) the existence of Congressional limitations on a tribe's
right of self-government; (3) the existence and wording of treaty
provisions relating to extradition; and, (4) the existence and extent
of present day self-government by the tribe. These four factors
would not only be all important in a future case involving a tribe's
attempt to have its control over extradition recognized or established, but in any case in which a tribe was attempting to establish its
right to some facet of self-government.
That Indians exercised self-government aboriginally is not difficult
to establish, there being many historical volumes, anthropological
writings and court cases to that effect. A problem might arise when a
21. 65 U.S. 66 (1860).
22. "If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depradation upon the
person of anyone, white, black, or Indian, subject to the authority of the United States and
at peace therewith, the Navajo Tribe agree that they will, on proof made to their agent, and
on notice by him, deliver up the wrongdoer to the United States, to be tried and punished
according to its laws; and in case they wilfully refuse to do so, the person injured shall be
reimbursed for his loss from the annuities or other moneys due or to become due to them
under this Treaty, or any others that may be made with the United States....
23. 17 Navajo Tribal Code§ 1001 (1969).
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tribe is required to show that it was, at some point in time, selfgoverned. However, this is unlikely, since American Indians are the
most studied people in the world. 2
A more technical question is presented when one attempts to
determine whether Congress has specifically acted to limit the
powers of a tribe with regard to extradition, and to confer increased
jurisdictional powers on the state within which the particular reservation exists. An example of this type of Congressional action is presented by 25 U.S.C. § 1321, which provides for state assumption of
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in
Indian country. This statute would probably extend to cover state
control of extradition of an Indian from an Indian reservation. Under
this section of the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 2 S the United States
allows criminal jurisdiction by a state over an Indian reservation with
the consent of the Indian tribe(s) to be affected. It should be noted
that the provision requiring the consent of the tribe(s) is a recognition of tribal sovereignty. Retrocession of criminal jurisdiction acquired by a state under 18 U.S.C. § 1162, which was repealed by 25
U.S.C.,§ 1322 (b), is also provided.
It is apparent from Turtle, supra, that article IV, section 2 of the
United States Constitution is not a limitation on the power of a tribe
to control extradition. Thus, unless a tribe is located on a reservation
within the boundaries of a state that has used 25 U.S.C. § 1321 to
assume criminal jurisdiction, or unless the tribe was the object of
specific Congressional action aimed solely at that tribe, it would have
the right and power to control extradition from its reservation, provided however that it could satisfy the other requirements enumerated
in Turtle.
Whether a tribe has a treaty provision exactly like the one contained in the Navajo treaty, which allows for the discretionary exercise of extradition power, depends to a great degree on the date the
United States government entered into a treaty with the particular
tribe. A perusal of the various treaties indicates that the extradition
provision has been commonly inserted into treaties with Indians
since 1868.26 Although a treaty was made prior to 1868, it may
contain words that may be construed as granting extradition power
to a tribe. Should it be found that a tribe's treaty contained no such
24. V. DeloriaJr., Custer Died for Your Sins, 78-101 (1969).
25. 25 U.S.C.A. § § 1301-1341 (Supp. 1970).
26. See generally, Treaty with the Sioux-Brule', Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai,
Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee-and Arapaho, April 29,
1868, art. 1, Kappler, supra, at note 3 at 998; Treaty with the Crows, May 7, 1868, art. 1,
Kappler, supra, at note 3 at 1008; Treaty with the Ute, March 2, 1868, art. 6, Kappler,
supra, at note 3 at 991.
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provision, the outcome of a case in which such power was asserted
would be a matter of conjecture.
It could be argued, under a generally accepted rule of statutory
construction, that since the power was not specifically denied to the
tribe by the treaty, the power still exists. Besides being a legitimate
result legally, it also is a fair result in light of the fact that the treaties
were drafted by skilled employees of the federal government, and it
is doubtful that the Indians had much influence on, nor an in-depth
grasp of, the contents of the document. Also, it would seem unjust
to deny to that group of tribes whose treaties were entered into prior
to 1868, but which are usually on an equal political level with the
group of tribes whose treaties were made subsequent to 1868, the
power to control extradition from their reservation solely because
they were unfortunate enough to have dealt with the federal government at an earlier date, or because the federal employees who
drafted the treaties had not yet conjured up this specific provision as
a standard clause.
The necessity for the last requirement; i.e., that a tribe be organized so as to have tribal government and tribal courts, is fairly
obvious. There must be some governmental branch to exercise the
extradition power. This requirement would eliminate those tribes
that have terminated or do not have a tribal government and those
tribes having a tribal government but no tribal court system, since as
a general rule extradition is a bilateral agreement and a jurisdiction
seeking extradition must be competent to try the person being
extradited.2 7
It should be noted that there are several aspects of Indian control
of extradition that are beyond the scope of this article. Having examined the right of a tribe to control extradition of a person from
the reservation to another state, nothing has been said about extraditing a person from a state to the reservation or extraditing a person
from one reservation to another. These aspects of extradition are
quite important, yet little, if anything, has ever been written about
them and they have never been explored in a judicial decision.2"
Tribal control of extradition is an important step toward the ultimate goal of self-determination. It is not that extradition, in itself, is
extremely important; it is that Indian tribes have added one more
item to a number of powers that they exercise over their own people.
This is self-determination; Indians controlling laws that affect In27. 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Extradition, § 1 (1967).
28. The converse of the area explored in this paper is examined in Dep't. of Int. Decisions of the Department of the Interior: Extradition to Indian Reservations of Indian
Fugitives, 57 Dep't. of Int. 344 (1941).
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dians, instead of control of laws affecting Indians by people who are
unable to comprehend the sometimes vast differences that exist between the two cultures. Odd as it may sound to some people to state
that cultural pluralism is, today, a prime cause of the "Indian problem," it is a fact. It is the feeling of the author that at such time as
the Indian people are willing and able to take control and the federal
government is willing to allow such, the so-called Indian problem will
cease to be such a problem. However, self-determination is not something that should be forced on the Indian at a set date, for the Indian
rightfully views with suspicion any forced policy of the federal government regardless of whether it is termed beneficial or helpful. The
move must come when the Indians themselves determine that they
are ready, and to the extent they feel is proper.
From the above discussion it can be concluded: 1. that Indian
control of extradition from their respective reservations was contemplated as early as 1868;
2. that there was no case in which the requirements of a tribe's
exercising this control were enumerated or discussed until Turtle,
supra, in 1969;
3. that Indian tribes have always enjoyed a sovereign status in that
they have always exercised some type of self-government;
4. that the right to control jurisdiction is a part of, and closely
related to, the right of self-government;
5. that Indian tribes who satisfy the requirements set out in Turtle,
supra, have the right and power to control extradition from their
reservations.
6. Those requirements are:
I. that the tribe have a history of self-government;
2. that there be no act of Congress denying this power to the
tribe;
3. that the tribe having a treaty provision allowing control of
extradition (although an argument can be made that this is not
absolutely essential);
4. that the tribe have a presently organized form of government
including a tribal court system.
Douglas Nash*

*Student, University of New Mexico School of Law, and member of the Nez Perce Tribe.

